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ARTICLES

THE SUPREME COURT AS THE
MAJOR BARRIER TO RACIAL EQUALITY
Ivan E. Bodensteiner*
This Article suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court, through its
decisions in cases alleging race discrimination, stands as a major
barrier to racial equality in the United States. There are several
aspects of its decisions that lead to this result. Between 1868 and
1954, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
while it had been interpreted to strike down a few blatant forms of
de jure discrimination, allowed government to separate the races
based on the “separate but equal” fiction. Beginning in 1954, Brown
and a series of subsequent decisions attacked this fiction, and for a
period of nearly twenty years, the Court was intent on eliminating
the vestiges of segregation in the schools, approving broad remedial
orders. This changed drastically beginning in 1974 when the Court
began limiting the available remedies and relieving school systems
of the burdens imposed by court orders. Around the same time, the
Court decided that equal protection plaintiffs needed to show a
discriminatory governmental purpose in order to trigger meaningful
constitutional protection. This meant that facially neutral laws and
practices with discriminatory effects were largely constitutional.
Beginning with Bakke in 1978, the Court made it difficult, and
eventually nearly impossible, for government to take affirmative
steps designed to promote equality. A majority of the Court
determined that invidious and benign racial classifications should
be treated the same under the Equal Protection Clause, with both
subjected to strict scrutiny. This completed the Court’s
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in a manner that
makes it a real barrier to racial equality: government is free to
engage in invidious discrimination as long as it masks the real
purpose, and affirmative steps designed by government to promote
equality will be struck down as a violation of equal protection.
Ironically, the constitutional amendment designed to promote
freedom and equality for the newly-freed slaves now stands in the
way of true freedom and equality.
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INTRODUCTION

After the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery in 1865, it
became apparent that the abolition of slavery as an institution would
not assure freedom and equality. This recognition led to the adoption
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868, prohibiting states from “deny[ing] to any person within [their]
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”1 At a minimum, this
clause was designed to address the inequality encountered by the
newly-freed slaves. It was an early acknowledgement that merely
eliminating legal approval and recognition of discrimination, in the
form of slavery, would not lead to equality. Today, 140 years after
adoption of the Equal Protection Clause and the passage of several
federal antidiscrimination statutes, we remain in essentially the
same position—racial minorities do not enjoy equality in the United
States.
My goal is not to demonstrate the absence of racial equality in
some of the most important aspects of our lives, such as health care,
education, housing, employment, political influence, and access to
resources. Rather, I assume inequality exists and attempt to identify
the single most responsible branch of government. Much to my
dismay, I conclude the U.S. Supreme Court, sitting at the top of our
system of justice, is most culpable. In this period of 140 years, there
is a very short period of time, roughly between 1954 and 1973,2
during which the Court demonstrated a willingness to use the Fifth3
and Fourteenth Amendments to promote racial equality. This is not
to suggest that the executive and legislative branches have promoted
racial equality consistently since 1868. While the record of these
branches is not stellar, I believe it is better than that of the Court,
even though the efforts of these two branches have been stymied
frequently by the Court.
Part II of this Article briefly explores the context and purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment. In Part III, I examine (a) some of the
key Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Equal Protection
Clause before Brown; (b) the promise of Brown; (c) the Court’s
rejection of Brown beginning in 1974; and (d) the Court’s decisions
limiting the ability of the other branches to promote racial equality
through legislation, by interpreting Section 5 of the Fourteenth
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. This coincides, roughly, with the period of the Warren Court. Of course, there
are a few exceptions, such as Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), in which the
Court held an invidious racial classification unconstitutional.
3. Although the Fifth Amendment does not contain an equal protection clause, in
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Court held that the right to equal
protection of the laws can be enforced against the federal government through the due
process provision in the Fifth Amendment.
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Amendment narrowly and by applying the most rigid standard of
review to affirmative steps taken by the other branches to promote
equality. Part IV notes the irony of the Court’s use of the Equal
Protection Clause to promote, or at least tolerate, race
discrimination.
II. PURPOSE OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
The Fourteenth Amendment states that “[n]o State shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”4 Five years after the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the
Court, in the Slaughterhouse Cases,5 stated: “notwithstanding the
formal recognition by those States of the abolition of slavery, the
condition of the slave race would, without further protection of the
Federal government, be almost as bad as it was before.”6 In short,
abolishment of slavery in 1865, by passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment, made the former slaves legally free, but did nothing to
assure equality. More specifically, in addressing the Equal Protection
Clause, the Court said
[i]n light of the history of these amendments, and the pervading
purpose of them . . . it is not difficult to give a meaning to this
clause. The existence of laws in the States where the newly
emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated with gross
injustice and hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be
remedied by this clause, and by it such laws are forbidden.”7

Because of this narrow focus on racial inequality, the Court
predicted that the Equal Protection Clause would address only race
discrimination.8 This prediction, of course, was not accurate as the
Court has, for example, held that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits sex discrimination unless the classification satisfies
intermediate scrutiny.9
A few years after its decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases, in
Strauder v. West Virginia,10 the Court struck down a state statute
excluding blacks from jury service and said the Fourteenth
Amendment was “one of a series of constitutional provisions having a
common purpose; namely, securing to a race recently emancipated, a

4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
6. Id. at 70.
7. Id. at 81.
8. Id. (“We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of
discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be
held to come within the purview of this provision.”).
9. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976).
10. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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race that through many generations had been held in slavery, all the
civil rights that the superior race enjoy.”11 Further, it said the
Fourteenth Amendment “was designed to assure to the colored race
the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under law are enjoyed by
white persons, and to give to that race the protection of the general
government, in that enjoyment, whenever it should be denied by the
States.”12 Four years later, in Pace v. State,13 the Court said the
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause “was to prevent hostile and
discriminating state legislation against any person or class of
persons,”14 but upheld an Alabama law that provided a harsher
punishment for adultery between a Negro and a white person than
adultery between persons of the same race.15 The same year, in The
Civil Rights Cases,16 the Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of
1875, on the grounds that it exceeded the power of Congress under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because it regulated private
conduct, but described the Fourteenth Amendment as extending “its
protection to races and classes, and prohibit[ing] any state legislation
which has the effect of denying to any race or class, or to any
individual, the equal protection of the laws.”17 In Plessy v.
Ferguson,18 the Court upheld public transportation facilities
separated by race, saying that while the
object of the [fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce
the absolute equality of the two races before the law, . . . in the
nature of things, it could not have been intended to abolish
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished
from political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon
terms unsatisfactory to either.19

In Brown v. Board of Education,20 before the Court rejected
Plessy and held that “[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently
unequal,”21 it scheduled reargument that was:
largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively
11. Id. at 306. In this context, the Court stated that the “recently emancipated”
race “especially needed protection against unfriendly action in the States where they
were resident,” id. (emphasis added), suggesting the Equal Protection Clause was not
aimed at friendly action, such as affirmative steps to assure equality. See id.
12. Id.
13. 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
14. Id. at 584.
15. Id. at 585.
16. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
17. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
18. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
19. Id. at 544.
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. Id. at 495.
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consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the
states, then existing practices in racial segregation, and the views
of proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion
and our own investigation convince us that, although these sources
cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which
we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive.22

Because of the status of public education in 1868, the Court noted it
was not surprising that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment
provided little guidance “relating to its intended effect on public
education.”23
The first clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed to overrule the Dred Scott v. Sandford24 decision. Beyond
that, the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to supplement the
Thirteenth Amendment, at least with respect to the former slaves,
because the framers recognized that legal status alone does not lead
to equality. Similarly, the current status of racial minorities in the
United States makes it apparent that neither a constitutional
provision nor statutes prohibiting intentional race discrimination
lead to equality. As with most provisions of the Constitution,
reasonable people can disagree about the appropriate interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause. But the early decisions of the Court
referred to above, while generally not favorable to the parties
alleging race discrimination, suggest that they were (a) designed to
supplement the Thirteenth Amendment in that the abolition of
slavery did not assure freedom and equality;25 (b) aimed at the
facially discriminatory laws that existed in many states and stood in
the way of “absolute equality;”26 and (c) aimed at prohibiting state
laws that have the effect of denying equal protection of the laws.27
Most importantly, there is nothing in either the history of the Equal
Protection Clause or the generally unfavorable pre-Brown decisions
that precludes an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that
would promote actual equality, instead of only formal equality.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 489.
Id. at 490.
60 U.S. 393 (1857).
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1873).
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883).
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III. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INTERPRETING THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
A. Pre-Brown Decisions
Shortly after adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, in
Strauder v. West Virginia,28 the Court held that a West Virginia law
limiting jury service to “white male persons who are twenty-one
years of age and who are citizens of this State,” violated the Equal
Protection Clause and was, therefore, unconstitutional.29 Despite the
decision in Strauder, the Equal Protection Clause did not get off to a
good start in the Supreme Court. A few years after Strauder, in Pace
v. Alabama,30 the Court interpreted the Equal Protection Clause
narrowly, holding that an Alabama criminal statute, which provided
a greater punishment for adultery between a Negro and a white
person than adultery between persons of the same race, did not
violate equal protection because there was no discrimination against
either race.31 The same year, in The Civil Rights Cases, the Court
limited the power of Congress, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, holding Congress could not pass a law prohibiting race
discrimination in the operation of privately-owned public
accommodations because the Equal Protection Clause limits only
state laws and acts committed under state authority.32 Justice
Harlan wrote a lengthy dissent, arguing that those who operate
public accommodations are “agents of the state,” and thus subject to
regulation by Congress when they engage in race discrimination.33
In 1896, the Court determined, in Plessy v. Ferguson, that “equal
but separate” transportation accommodations for the white and
“colored” races did not violate equal protection.34 Such laws,
according to the Court, “do not necessarily imply the inferiority of
either race to the other,” and the Court referred to the plaintiff’s
assumption that the “enforced separation of the two races stamps the
colored race with a badge of inferiority” as the “underlying fallacy” of
his argument.35 Justice Harlan, in dissent, indicated everyone knows
that the Louisiana statute “had its origin in the purpose, not so much
to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to
exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

100 U.S. 303 (1879).
Id. at 305.
106 U.S. 583 (1883).
Id. at 585.
109 U.S. at 23.
Id. at 58 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896).
Id. at 544, 551.
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persons.”36 He accurately predicted that the judgment in Plessy “will,
in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this
tribunal in the Dred Scott case.”37 “Separate but equal” remained the
law until Brown was decided in 1954, although in between Plessy and
Brown, the Court found a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in
a few cases where the educational opportunity was clearly not
equal.38
Ten years before Brown, there was yet another low point in the
history of the United States Supreme Court when it concluded, in
Korematsu v. United States,39 that the federal government’s
placement of Japanese-Americans in concentration camps did not
violate equal protection because it was justified by national security
concerns.40 The Court reached this result even though it stated “that
all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect” and are therefore subjected to “the
most rigid scrutiny.”41 While he said the Court was utilizing “the
most rigid scrutiny,” it is quite apparent that Justice Black, who
delivered the opinion of the Court, was deferring to the judgment of
the United States military.42 Justice Murphy wrote that he dissents
“from this legalization of racism” and indicated that racial
discrimination “is utterly revolting among a free people who have
embraced the principles set forth in the Constitution of the United
States.”43
Even though a few challenges to racial classifications, based on
the Equal Protection Clause, were successful before Brown, the Court
had rendered the clause quite ineffective in addressing race
discrimination. Race discrimination flourished under the “separate
but equal” regime because the equal portion of the equation generally
was not enforced by courts. There was no way to fit Korematsu into

36. Id. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 559.
38. See McLaurin v. Okla. St. Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 643 (1950)
(ruling that after blacks were admitted to what had been an all-white school, the
university could not segregate them in areas of the classrooms, libraries, and
cafeterias). In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633-34 (1950), the University of Texas
Law School denied admission to a black applicant because he could attend Prairie
View Law School, a recently-created school for black students, but the Court held
there was not substantial equality in the educational opportunities at the two schools.
See also Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (holding that Missouri violated equal
protection in denying admission to black students at its law school, but offering to pay
for them to attend law school in other states).
39. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
40. Id. at 218-19.
41. Id. at 216.
42. See id. at 223-24.
43. Id. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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the “separate but equal” doctrine because, as in Strauder, there was
no pretense of equality. Korematsu was like Strauder in that a
particular race was singled out and disadvantaged, but the Court
was unwilling to reach the same result it reached in Strauder.
Instead, the Court pretended that “Korematsu was not excluded from
the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race,” but rather
“[he] was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese
Empire.”44 Even when Brown arrived at the Supreme Court during
its 1952-53 term, according to Justice Douglas, a majority of the
Justices were ready to rule “that separate but equal schools were
constitutional, that separate but unequal schools were not
constitutional, and that the remedy was to give the states time to
make the two systems of schools equal.”45
B. Brown and Its Short-Lived Promise
If we accept Justice Douglas’s bleak assessment of the situation,
only the death of Chief Justice Vinson during the summer of 1953,
and the appointment of Earl Warren as his replacement, led to the
unanimous decision in Brown, holding that “in the field of public
education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal.”46 Therefore, the
segregation in the five school districts before the Court violated equal
protection; and, after further argument, in 1955, the Court
determined the appropriate remedy, which essentially deferred to the
trial courts for the application of equitable principles and created the
famous “all deliberate speed” standard of the Court.47
Not surprisingly, the mere elimination of Jim Crow laws, such as
laws providing for segregated schools, did not lead to equality. For a
period of approximately fifteen years, it appeared the Court was
serious about ending segregation in public education. In the early
years after its decision in Brown, the Court was adamant about not
only eliminating the laws providing for segregation in education but
also eliminating the effects of that government-approved
discrimination. In Cooper v. Aaron,48 the Court relied on Marbury in
determining that its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in
Brown is the supreme law of the land and binding upon the states.49
Ten years after Brown, in Griffin v. County School Board,50 the Court
found that it was unconstitutional for school systems to close rather
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975, at 113 (1980).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
358 U.S. 1 (1958).
Id. at 18-19.
377 U.S. 218 (1964).
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than desegregate, and assessed the resistance to Brown by stating
“[t]here has been entirely too much deliberation and not enough
speed in enforcing [Brown].”51 A few years later, in Green v. County
School Board,52 the Court declared that school boards have “the
affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to
convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be
eliminated root and branch,” and held that a “‘freedom-of-choice’
plan” violated equal protection.53 Three years later, in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,54 the Court reiterated
the goal of “eliminat[ing] from the public schools all vestiges of stateimposed segregation,”55 in upholding a lower court order requiring
racial balance, prohibiting one-race schools absent a strong showing
by the school district that such schools were not the result of present
or past discrimination, approving affirmative action in the form of
altered attendance zones, and permitting busing as a means of
desegregating.56 It was necessary for the Court to “defin[e] in more
precise terms [than it had done before] the scope of the duty of school
authorities and district courts in implementing” the decision in
Brown.57 Swann clarified that broad remedial powers are available to
the district courts, including busing and other affirmative steps
designed to achieve racial balance in formerly segregated school
systems.58 Finally, in Norwood v. Harrison,59 the Court held the
Equal Protection Clause prohibited a state from subsidizing private
schools that engaged in race discrimination in order to circumvent
Brown.60 The Court stated, “[t]he existence of a permissible purpose
cannot sustain an action that has an impermissible effect.”61
51. Id. at 229.
52. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
53. Id. at 437-38.
54. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
55. Id. at 15.
56. Id. at 22-31.
57. Id. at 6.
58. Id at 22-31.
59. 413 U.S 455 (1973). Shortly before Norwood, the Court addressed segregation
in the North in Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). Although the
Denver school system was never segregated by mandate of state or local law, the Court
held that “a finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful
portion of a school system . . . creates a presumption that other segregated schooling
within the system is not adventitious” and creates “a prima facie case of unlawful
segregative design,” shifting the burden to the school system to prove “that other
segregated schools within the system are not also the result of intentionally
segregative actions.” Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208. Not surprisingly, Justice Rehnquist
dissented. Id. at 254-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
60. See Norwood, 413 U.S. at 463-65.
61. Id. at 466 (quoting Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 (1972))
(emphasis added). While this decision was not explicitly overruled by Washington v.
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Around this time the makeup of the Court was changing.62 These
changes may help to explain a critical five-four decision in 1974,
demonstrating that the Court quickly lost its interest in promoting
equality.63
C. The Rejection of Brown’s Promise during the Years Justice
Rehnquist Served on the Court
Although Justice Rehnquist did not replace Chief Justice Burger
until 1986, the rejection of Brown seems to coincide with Justice
Rehnquist’s time on the Court, beginning in 1972.64 Starting with
Milliken v. Bradley,65 the Court significantly limited the district
courts’ power to use an interdistrict remedy in attempting to address
a single-district segregation problem.66 The Court stated:
Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts
may be set aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial
purposes or by imposing a cross-district remedy, it must first be
shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one
district that produces a significant segregative effect in another
district. Specifically, it must be shown that racially discriminatory
acts of the state or local school districts or of a single school district
have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation.67

Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by three other
Justices, in which he noted that the decision in Milliken “cripples the
ability of the judiciary to perform [its remedial] task,” and, as a
result, “deliberate acts of segregation and their consequences will go
unremedied, not because a remedy would be infeasible or
unreasonable in terms of the usual criteria governing school
desegregation cases, but because an effective remedy would cause
what the Court considers to be undue administrative inconvenience
to the State.”68 As a result, Justice White observed, the “State of
Michigan, the entity at which the Fourteenth Amendment is
directed, has successfully insulated itself from its duty to provide
Davis, finding the “effect” impermissible is inconsistent with Davis. See infra notes 7476 and accompanying text.
62. In 1969, Chief Justice Burger replaced Chief Justice Warren; in 1970, Justice
Blackmun replaced Justice Fortas; in 1972, Justice Powell replaced Justice Black and
Justice Rehnquist replaced Justice Harlan; in 1975, Justice Stevens replaced Justice
Douglas; and in 1981, Justice O’Connor replaced Justice Stewart. PETER CHARLES
HOFFER, ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT: AN ESSENTIAL HISTORY 369, 372-76 (Michael
Briggs, ed., Univ. Press of Kansas 2007).
63. See infra note 65.
64. Id. at 408.
65. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
66. See id. at 744-45.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 762-63 (White, J., dissenting).
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effective desegregation remedies by vesting sufficient power over its
public schools in its local school districts.”69
Thus, within a year after its decision in Norwood, the Court
signaled it was not willing to use the Equal Protection Clause to
abolish segregation when it placed substantial limits on the power of
the courts to “impose a multidistrict, area wide remedy to a singledistrict de jure segregation problem.”70 It did this even though it said,
in Brown, that “the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place” in
the “field of public education” and “[s]eparate educational facilities
are inherently unequal.”71 When combined with its decision a year
earlier, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,72
the effect of Milliken was disastrous. Those who favor segregated
schools had won the battle; Brown, while not overruled, had become
fairly irrelevant. By the 1972-73 school year, over ninety-one percent
of southern schools were desegregated; however, between 1988 and
1998, most of the progress was lost.73
Milliken was followed by a series of Supreme Court decisions
that fatally wounded the Equal Protection Clause as an agent of
racial equality. Shortly after Milliken, the Court delivered an
important blow to the Equal Protection Clause in Davis,74 holding
that “[t]he central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct
discriminating on the basis of race” and that “disproportionate
impact . . . alone . . . does not trigger the rule that racial
classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are
justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.”75 In short,
Washington v. Davis requires that plaintiffs alleging racial
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause prove
intentional discrimination, that is, that the challenged action was
taken “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects.”76 As

69. Id. at 763.
70. Id. at 721 (majority opinion).
71. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
72. 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that significant disparities in school funding
resulting from a wide difference in the tax base of school districts does not violate
equal protection).
73. See GARY ORFIELD, SCHOOLS MORE SEPARATE: CONSEQUENCES OF A DECADE OF
RESEGREGATION
2
(2001),
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/Schools_More_Separate.pdf.
74. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
75. Id. at 239, 242 (citations omitted). Standing in contrast to the Davis holding,
see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886), where the Court held that a law
“fair on its face, and impartial in appearance” nevertheless violates equal protection “if
it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal
hand.”
76. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
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stated in Feeney, “‘[d]iscriminatory purpose’ . . . implies more than
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.”77
In the same year it decided Washington v. Davis, the Court
decided Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler,78 in which
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, said “having once
implemented a racially neutral attendance pattern in order to
remedy the perceived constitutional violations on the part of the
defendants, the District Court had fully performed its function of
providing the appropriate remedy for previous racially
discriminatory attendance patterns.”79 In other words, the federal
courts were not to police the school districts to guard against
resegregation. The Court made it clear that the Equal Protection
Clause does not ban segregation nor assure actual equality in public
education; rather, it bans only intentional discrimination, that is,
segregation that is the result of intentional government action.80
Thus, by 1976, only twenty-two years after Brown, it was
apparent that the Fourteenth Amendment would tolerate a public
education system that is “inherently unequal” by virtue of its
segregated schools, so long as a challenger could not prove the
segregation resulted from government action intended to achieve a
segregated school system.81 When this is combined with the decision
in Rodriguez,82 holding that a large disparity in per-pupil
expenditures in different school districts within a state that opts for
local control and funding does not violate the Equal Protection

77. Id. (citation omitted). Justice Stevens concurred in both Davis and Feeney. In
Davis, he observed “that the line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory
impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader of the
Court’s opinion might assume.” 426 U.S. at 254 (Stevens, J., concurring). He states
that not every disproportionate impact gives rise to a constitutional claim, but where
“the disproportion is dramatic . . . it really does not matter whether the standard is
phrased in terms of purpose or effect.” Id. The challenge to the test at issue was
insufficient, according to Stevens, because the test served “a neutral and legitimate
purpose of requiring all applicants to meet a minimum standard of literacy” and was
“used throughout the federal service.” Id. at 254-55. Justice Stevens agreed with the
outcome in Feeney because “the number of males disadvantaged by [the Massachusetts
law] (1,867,000) is sufficiently large—and sufficiently close to the number of
disadvantaged females (2,954,000)—to refute the claim that the rule was intended to
benefit males as a class over females as a class.” 442 U.S. at 281 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
78. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
79. Id. at 436-37.
80. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
81. Four Justices in Parents Involved in Community School v. Seattle School
District No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007), repeated the distinction between de jure and de
facto segregation, with the latter not having constitutional implications. Id. at 2761
(plurality opinion).
82. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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Clause,83 the Court’s license to the states to operate a public school
system providing children with an education that is “inherently
unequal” was granted in full.84 As a result, today we have states
operating school systems in which the per-pupil expenditure varies
widely, depending on the district’s property tax base, and in which
many children attend schools that are predominantly one race.85
Frequently, the school districts with the lowest per-pupil expenditure
are those with the largest racial minority population.86
Any doubt about the Court’s willingness to tolerate segregated
schools was eliminated in Board of Education of Oklahoma City
Public Schools v. Dowell,87 in which Justice Rehnquist, again writing
for the Court, held that school districts were entitled to be relieved of
burdensome court orders that displaced local authority at the point
the school district can demonstrate that the “vestiges of past
discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable.”88 In
dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens,
expressed his belief that “a desegregation decree cannot be lifted so
long as conditions likely to inflict the stigmatic injury condemned in
Brown I persist and there remain feasible methods of eliminating
such conditions.”89
The dismantling of Brown continued the following year when the
Court decided, in Freeman v. Pitts,90 that a school district could be
83. See supra note 72.
84. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 1234-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
85. See, e.g., Diane Rado, Rich School, Poor School; Suburbs Facing a Great Divide
Over Spending for Students, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 4, 2007, at C1 (showing that the
wealthiest elementary district (10% low income students) in Lake County, near
Chicago, spends $22,508 per student, while another school district (73% low-income
students) in the same county spends $8,675 per student). In the Chicago public
schools, where there were 336,793 African Americans under age eighteen, 265,857
Hispanics under age eighteen, and 228,041 Caucasians under age eighteen, according
to the 2000 Census. CHILDREN AND FAMILY RESEARCH CTR., CENSUS DATA: CHICAGO
COMMUNITY (2000), http://xinia.social.uiuc.edu/outcomes/chidata.htm. In 2006, 264
schools had 90% or more African-American students, 46 schools had 90% or more
Hispanic students, and no schools had 90% or more Caucasian students. DEP’T OF
APPLIED RES., CHI. PUB. SCH., RACIAL/ETHNIC SURVEY OF STUDENTS AS OF SEPT. 29,
2006, at 1-43 (2006); see also Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2801-02 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“Between 1968 and 1980, the number of black children attending a school
where minority children constituted more than half of the school fell from 77% to 63%
in the Nation . . . but then reversed direction by the year 2000, rising from 63% to 72%
in the Nation . . . . Today, more than one in six black children attend a school that is
99-100% minority.”).
86. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 11-13.
87. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
88. Id. at 250. For a recent application of Dowell, see Anderson v. School Board of
Madison County, 517 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 2008).
89. Id. at 252 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
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relieved of the provisions of a court order part-by-part.91 In this case,
the school district was entitled to be relieved of the portion of the
order requiring desegregation in pupil assignment and in facilities,
because those terms had been met, even though the school district
had not complied with a provision relating to the assignment of
teachers.92 Further, since the facilities portion of the order had been
met, the district court could not review the discriminatory effects of
the district’s plan to build a facility that would likely be of greater
benefit to white students than black students.93 Finally, in Missouri
v. Jenkins,94 the Court terminated a school desegregation order
governing the Kansas City Schools, holding (i) that the district
court’s attempt to attract nonminority students from outside the
district was impermissible because there had been no showing of an
interdistrict violation, (ii) the district court lacked authority to order
an increase in teachers’ salaries, based on its belief that such an
increase designed to attract teachers was essential for desegregation,
and (iii) the continuing disparity in student test scores did not justify
retaining the desegregation order because the Constitution requires
only equal opportunity, not any particular result.95 Even though the
1977 district court order was making a difference by reducing the
number of black children enrolled in schools with a ninety percent or
more black enrollment, the Court was willing to abandon the
“project.”96 Eighteen years, 1977-1995, is a relatively short period in
which to fix a school system that had been segregated by state
statute, but the Court appeared unconcerned about the continuing
disparity in student performance. Interestingly, in the five cases,
Milliken through Jenkins, Justice Rehnquist authored three of the
opinions for the Court and joined the opinion of the Court in the
other two cases.
The significance of the decision in Davis, requiring that those
alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause show a
discriminatory purpose, cannot be overstated.97 While a
discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the surrounding
91. See id. at 471.
92. See id. at 492.
93. See id. at 492-99.
94. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
95. Id. at 89-102.
96. Id. at 154 (Souter, J., dissenting).
97. While the Court is willing to require challengers in equal protection cases to
show a discriminatory purpose, in other areas it has expressed a reluctance to inquire
into the purpose of legislation. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968)
(“Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter.”); see also
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 469-70 (1981) (plurality
opinion) (explaining that the search for the actual or primary purpose of a statute “is
likely to be elusive”).
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circumstances, it is nevertheless difficult to prove when the racial
classification does not appear on the face of the law, ordinance, or
policy at issue. The effect of the decision in Washington v. Davis is
clearly demonstrated in a sex discrimination case, Personnel
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,98 where a Massachusetts
statute provided a veterans’ preference for veterans who applied for
state civil service positions.99 When the case was filed, over ninetyeight percent of the veterans in Massachusetts were male and the
district court referred to the absolute preference provided by the
statute as having “a devastating impact upon the employment
opportunities of women.”100 So, the discriminatory effect of the
statute was obvious. However, the Court said the dispositive question
“is whether the appellee has shown that a gender-based
discriminatory purpose has, at least in some measure, shaped the
Massachusetts veterans’ preference legislation.”101 Ms. Feeney’s
“ultimate argument rest[ed] upon the presumption, common to the
criminal and civil law, that a person intends the natural and
foreseeable consequences of his voluntary actions.”102 After conceding
that it would be “disingenuous to say that the adverse consequences
of this legislation for women were unintended, in the sense that they
were not volitional or in the sense that they were not foreseeable,”103
the Court went on to explain that “discriminatory purpose,” for
purposes of equal protection litigation, “implies more than intent as
volition or intent as awareness of consequences.”104 Rather, the
challenger must show that the decisionmaker “selected or reaffirmed
a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely
‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”105
The “discriminatory purpose” approach to race discrimination is
somewhat at odds with current cognitive psychology, suggesting that
race discrimination is often unconscious and that “unconscious
racism . . . underlies much of the racially disproportionate impact of
governmental policy.”106 A social cognition approach to discrimination
is based on three premises: first, stereotyping or categorization is a
common cognitive mechanism used by most people “to simplify the
task of perceiving, processing, and retaining information about

98. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
99. Id. at 259.
100. Id. at 260.
101. Id. at 276.
102. Id. at 278.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 279.
105. Id.
106. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 355 (1987).
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people in memory;” second, stereotypes operate as “person
prototypes” or “social schemas” that function as “implicit theories,
biasing in predictable ways the perception, interpretation, encoding,
retention, and recall of information about other people,” and these
cognitive biases “operate absent intent to favor or disfavor members
of a particular social group,” and “bias a decisionmaker’s judgment
long before the ‘moment of decision;’” and third, these stereotypes,
“when they function as implicit prototypes or schemas, operate
beyond the reach of decisionmaker self-awareness,” making cognitive
bias “both unintentional and unconscious.”107 These cognitive biases,
because they operate automatically, “must be controlled, if at all,
through subsequent ‘mental correction.’”108 As a result, “[t]o establish
liability for . . . discrimination, a . . . plaintiff [should] simply be
required to prove that his group status played a role in causing the
employer’s action or decision. Causation would no longer be equated
with intentionality.”109
Even if the Court is correct in requiring the challenger who
asserts a claim based on the Equal Protection Clause to show intent,
why does it define intent differently than it is defined in a wellestablished body of, for example, tort law? A more appropriate way to
determine the constitutionality of the Massachusetts statute would
have been to find an intentional classification that disadvantaged
female applicants, and then address whether the justification for the
statute, that is, “to reward veterans for the sacrifice of military
service, to ease the transition from military to civilian life, to
encourage patriotic service, and to attract loyal and well-disciplined
people to civil service occupations,”110 met the intermediate standard
of review for sex discrimination.
As described by the Court in Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,111 Washington v. Davis
“made it clear that official action will not be held unconstitutional
solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact,” which,
although not irrelevant, alone will not establish racially
discriminatory intent or purpose.112 The Court in Arlington Heights
recognized that the challenger does not have “to prove that the
challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes,”
but rather, that “a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating
107. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1161, 1187-88 (1995).
108. Id. at 1216 (citation omitted).
109. Id. at 1242 (emphasis added).
110. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 265.
111. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
112. Id. at 264-65.
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factor in the decision.”113 It went on to describe how the challenger
can attempt to prove this, through a showing of (a) a disproportionate
impact, which in some cases may establish such a clear pattern that
is “unexplainable on grounds other than race,” (b) the historical
background of the challenged decision, including the sequence of
events leading to the decision, departures from the normal
procedural sequence and substantive departures, and (c) the
legislative or administrative history, particularly where there are
contemporary statements are made by members of the body in the
course of rendering the challenged decision.114
Later, in Hunter v. Underwood,115 the Court indicated that if the
race discrimination plaintiff shows race was a substantial or
motivating factor behind the law or decision that is challenged, the
burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that the law would
have been enacted without considering this factor.116 In Hunter, a
law that denied the right to vote to anyone who had been convicted of
a crime involving “moral turpitude” had a substantial discriminatory
impact against black residents of Alabama.117 The Court agreed that
race discrimination was a key purpose behind the legislation when it
was adopted in 1901 and the government failed in its burden of
demonstrating that the law would have been enacted without this
consideration.118
So, three key decisions of the Supreme Court—Rodriguez (1973),
Milliken (1974), and Davis (1976)119—established the legal
framework that allows today’s situation in public education.
Rodriguez allows states to avoid responsibility for inequality in
resources by establishing independent local school districts, with

113. Id. at 265-66.
114. Id. at 266-68. Compare City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66-68 (1980) (no
showing of a discriminatory purpose in establishing or maintaining an at-large system
of electing the three members of a City Commission), with Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S.
613, 622 (1982) (holding that an at-large system of electing members of a County
Commission was unconstitutional, based on the District Court’s finding that the
system was “maintained for [the] invidious purpose” of diluting the voting strength of
the black population).
115. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
116. Id. at 228.
117. Id. at 227.
118. Id. at 231-33.
119. The Court deciding Rodriguez and Milliken consisted of Justices Burger,
Stewart, Powell, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall; the
latter four Justices dissented in each of the two cases. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717 (1974); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The
Davis Court was the same, except Justice Stevens had replaced Justice Douglas, and
only two Justices, Brennan and Marshall, dissented. See Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976).
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property taxes as the primary source of funds.120 Similarly, Milliken
excuses states from responsibility to avoid segregation by
establishing independent local school districts and allowing parental
choice of residence to preclude court-ordered integration.121 Davis
provides the excuse to ignore the discriminatory effects of facially
neutral government actions and insulates such effects from
challenges based on the Equal Protection Clause,122 unless the
challenger can prove a discriminatory purpose, that is, the
government “decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular
course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’
its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”123 This means there is
no equal protection problem where a state tolerates a predominantly
white suburban school district, spending nearly $600 per pupil, while
an adjoining predominantly minority urban school district spends
around $350 per pupil.124 Further, the fact that the education
provided in these two districts is “inherently unequal” does not offend
the Constitution.
Of course, the Court is not the sole cause of this tragic situation.
There is plenty of blame to go around—the executive and legislative
branches of government are partly responsible, and parents who
select housing based, at least in part, on the type of education
available play a role. But, the fact remains that the Court, through
its interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, has paved the way
for the segregated educational systems operating in many states. Not
only has the Court interpreted the clause narrowly when those
seeking equality rely on it, it has interpreted the clause broadly to
prohibit benign race-conscious decisions when those opposed to
government making race-conscious decisions to achieve equality
challenge such decisions. As stated by Justice Marshall in Bakke,
[I]t must be remembered that, during most of the past 200 years,
the Constitution as interpreted by this Court did not prohibit the
most ingenious and pervasive forms of discrimination against the
Negro. Now, when a State acts to remedy the effects of that legacy

120. 411 U.S. at 23-26.
121. See 418 U.S. at 741-49.
122. See 426 U.S. at 242-46.
123. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
124. In Rodriguez, a school district in the core-city of San Antonio, where
approximately 90% of the students were Mexican-American and over 6% of the
students were African-American, spent $356 per pupil, while another school district in
San Antonio, where the student population was 18% Mexican-American and less than
1% African-American, spent $594 per student. 411 U.S. at 11-13. The Court decided
there was no violation of equal protection. Id. at 28-29.
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of discrimination, I cannot believe that this same Constitution
stands as a barrier.125

The point is that many low-income children are not receiving an
adequate education in our public school system, and without such an
education at the elementary and secondary level, it is difficult to
level the playing field in the future. When low-income children
receive an inferior education, this means a disproportionate number
of minority children are receiving an inferior education.
Unfortunately, being left behind in elementary and secondary
education often results in being left behind in higher education and
in employment. Recognizing the adverse effects of an inadequate
education leads some higher educational institutions to take
affirmative steps designed to compensate for the failures of public
education. When these affirmative steps are challenged, the Supreme
Court is very willing to use the Equal Protection Clause to strike
them down.126 The Court’s decisions are, therefore, not only
responsible for the need for affirmative, remedial steps, but also
responsible for making it very difficult for the executive and
legislative branches to take remedial action.
The Court has stood in the path of legislation aimed at
promoting equality in three major ways. First, the Court has
narrowed the scope of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
thereby limiting the power of Congress to pass legislation. This
started with the 1997 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,127 holding
that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeded the Section 5
power of Congress because the “congruence and proportionality”
between the injury to be addressed and the means utilized was
lacking.128 Second, the Court has insisted on applying strict scrutiny
when facing a challenge to affirmative steps taken by government in
an effort to promote racial equality and, as a result, it has found most
such efforts to violate the Equal Protection Clause.129 Third, the
Rehnquist Court has narrowly interpreted civil rights statutes,
including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to the point that
Congress has responded with several “restoration” acts.130 Of course
125. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
126. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738 (2007); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
127. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
128. Id. at 520.
129. See discussion infra Part III.D.
130. See, e.g., Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2 § 181, 123
Stat. 5 (rejecting the Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550
U.S. 618 (2007), and clarifying that a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice that is unlawful under statutes prohibiting employment discrimination occurs
each time compensation is paid pursuant to the discriminatory decision or practice);
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the impact of the Court’s legal framework extends far beyond public
education, promoting inequality in employment, contracting,
housing, health care, and other aspects of society.
All of this leads me to conclude that the U.S. Supreme Court,
since the mid-1970s and continuing to the present, is the institution
most responsible for racial inequality in this country. It is indeed a
sad state of affairs when the nation’s “justice” system is the greatest
cause of injustice. Even the Court recognizes that “compliance with
the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on racial discrimination . . .
bolsters the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system”131 and
that “[r]ace discrimination is ‘especially pernicious in the
administration of justice.’”132 There is, indeed, reason to question the
legitimacy of our justice system.
D. Blocking Political Branches’ Attempts to Promote Equality
In a series of cases, beginning with Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke133 and culminating with Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,134 the Court has
made it very difficult for federal, state, and local government to take
benign race-conscious steps designed to promote racial equality.135
Just as those who promoted the Fourteenth Amendment realized
that making slavery illegal would not ensure freedom and equality,
government officials across the country, as well as leaders of private
institutions, understand that prohibiting race discrimination does
not assure equality.136 The Court has continually blocked their
efforts.
When the so-called “affirmative action”137 cases came before the
Court, starting with Bakke, a key issue concerned the appropriate
standard of review. Recall that in the context of invidious race
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3406, 122 Stat. 3553 (rejecting
several Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Americans with Disability Act in a
manner that narrowed the intended broad scope of the Act).
131. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510-11 (2005).
132. Id. at 511 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979)).
133. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
134. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
135. I do not include the Court’s decisions in voting cases addressing race-conscious
districting. Generally, if race is used in drawing election districts, strict scrutiny
applies even though no one is excluded from voting and every vote is counted equally.
See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958-59 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 906-07
(1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920-21 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,
643-45 (1993).
136. See generally Bakke, 438 U.S. at 364-73 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
137. I try to avoid using this term because it has a pejorative connotation,
suggesting quotas and other sorts of horrible actions designed to disfavor white
persons.
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discrimination, the Court, as early as Korematsu, indicated that legal
restrictions on the rights of a single racial group were “immediately
suspect” and subject to the “most rigid scrutiny.”138 Strict scrutiny
requires the government to show that it has a compelling
justification for the racial classification and that the means selected
to accomplish its goal are the least restrictive or narrowly tailored.139
When addressing invidious race discrimination, Korematsu remains
the only case in which the Court found that government had met its
burden.140
In Bakke, four Justices argued that intermediate scrutiny should
govern benign racial classifications, that is, those intended to benefit
minorities.141 This position never gained the support of five Justices
and, after skirting the issue in several cases, in Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co.,142 the Court held that strict scrutiny governs all racial
classifications, both invidious and benign, when the classification
was made by state or local government.143 A year later, in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,144 the
Court held that race-conscious programs adopted by Congress would
be subjected to intermediate scrutiny because Congress, as the
“National Legislature,” was entitled to deference.145 However, five
years later, that decision was overruled when the Court, in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,146 held “that all racial classifications,
imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor,
must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”147 This
means that all benign race-conscious actions, designed to promote
racial equality, will be subjected to strict scrutiny, a standard that is
nearly always fatal. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens refers
to the Court’s “disconcerting lecture about the evils of governmental
racial classifications” and its assumption “that there is no significant
difference between a decision by the majority to impose a special
burden on the members of a minority race and a decision by the
majority to provide a benefit to certain members of that minority
notwithstanding its incidental burden on some members of the

138.
139.
140.
141.
part).
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 358-62 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
Id. at 493-94.
497 U.S. 547 (1990).
Id. at 563-66.
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
Id. at 227.
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majority.”148 Justice Stevens states that the assumption of the
majority is untenable because “[i]nvidious discrimination is an
engine of oppression, subjugating a disfavored group to enhance or
maintain the power of the majority. Remedial race-based preferences
reflect the opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality in society.”149
When applying strict scrutiny, a racial classification can fail
either because the government has not established a compelling
justification or because the government fails to show that the means
selected is narrowly tailored. The first prong of this standard can be
satisfied when government is attempting to remedy past
discrimination by the entity that is taking the affirmative steps. So,
for example, if a minority proves invidious race discrimination by a
municipality in hiring, as part of the remedy, the court may order the
municipality to take affirmative steps to remedy that past wrong. If a
municipality wants to take affirmative steps voluntarily to address
past discrimination, it must establish a prima facie case that it has
discriminated in the past in the particular activity at issue, such as
employment or contracting.150 Of course, most municipalities are
reluctant to make a determination that they have engaged in
invidious discrimination in the past.
The theory of unconscious discrimination, or implicit bias,151
informs the need for and utility of affirmative steps designed to
promote equality. Such affirmative steps can be seen “as attempts by
the state to correct for implicit bias, and thus, to break the
connection between such bias and outcomes” and a “preference for
148. Id. at 242-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 243.
150. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 498-506. Compare Croson, id.,
with Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971),
where the Court said:
In seeking to define even in broad and general terms how far this
remedial power extends it is important to remember that judicial powers
may be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional violation. Remedial
judicial authority does not put judges automatically in the shoes of school
authorities whose powers are plenary. Judicial authority enters only when
local authority defaults.
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to
formulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for
example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each
school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting
the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy
is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities; absent a
finding of a constitutional violation, however, that would not be within the
authority of a federal court.
In Parents Involved in Community School v. Seattle School District No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2752 n.10 (2007), the Court, as well as the plurality, id. at 2762, dismissed this
portion of Swann as dicta.
151. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.

2009]

BARRIER TO RACIAL EQUALITY

221

those harmed by the biased assessments can help prevent the
implicit bias from being translated into final outcomes.”152 Efforts to
“debias” decisionmaking, both direct and indirect, can be enhanced
by affirmative steps because “the presence of population diversity in
an environment tends to reduce the level of implicit bias,”153 and
affirmative steps can lead to increased diversity.154 Further, by
tolerating plans or programs calling for affirmative steps designed to
promote equality, “the law is engaging in a form of indirect
debiasing; that is, regulated actors are permitted to take steps that,
in turn, tend to reduce implicit bias.”155 Two other authors argue that
a proper interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII
would allow employers to engage in affirmative action in order to
produce a diverse workforce and thereby reduce implicit bias.156 This
empirical data supports a common sense notion that the most
effective way to address the effects of discrimination in employment,
for example, is to design a program that addresses the causes of
unequal opportunity and, in fact, leads to more jobs for racial
minorities. It is difficult to pretend we have eliminated race
discrimination by simply passing laws making it illegal, but ignoring
the fact that the results show little or no improvement in
employment opportunities for racial minorities.
In the context of education, a majority of the Court, in Grutter v.
Bollinger,157 accepted diversity in an educational institution (a law
school) as a compelling government interest.158 However, the decision
is narrow and such programs must meet the narrowly tailored
requirement.159 They cannot use a quota system, applicants must be
evaluated individually, all factors that may contribute to student
body diversity must be meaningfully considered along with race, the
school must consider workable race-neutral alternatives, the raceconscious admissions program must not unduly harm members of
any racial group, and the program should be limited in time.160
The continuing vitality of Grutter was placed in issue when the
Court, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School

152. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV.
969, 979-80 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
153. Id. at 981 (footnote omitted).
154. Id. at 980.
155. Id. at 987.
156. Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist
Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1111-15 (2006).
157. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
158. Id. at 328.
159. Id. at 333-34.
160. See id. at 336-42.
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District No. 1,161 struck down the school districts’ use of race in
assigning students to a particular school in order to assure “that the
racial balance at the school falls within a predetermined range based
on the racial composition of the school district as a whole.”162 The
Seattle School District, the Court noted, had “never operated
segregated schools, nor . . . ha[d] it been subjected to court-ordered
desegregation,” but used “the racial tiebreaker in an attempt to
address the effects of racially identifiable housing patterns on school
assignments.”163 In contrast, the Jefferson County Public Schools,
which operates the public school system in Louisville, Kentucky, had
maintained a segregated school system until 1975 when the federal
court entered a desegregation decree; however, this decree was
dissolved in 2000 after a finding that it had achieved unitary
status.164 A student assignment plan adopted in 2001 required that
“all non magnet schools maintain a minimum black enrollment of 15
percent and a maximum black enrollment of 50 percent,” in a system
in which approximately 34 percent of the students are black.165
Five Justices voted to strike down both the Seattle plan and the
Louisville plan; however, to understand the meaning of the case, it is
necessary to analyze carefully the plurality opinion of Justice
Roberts166 and the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, who
supplied the critical fifth vote. Justice Roberts, in a portion of his
opinion joined by Justice Kennedy, suggests that diversity may be a
compelling government interest only in higher education, because
Grutter “relied upon considerations unique to institutions of higher
education.”167 In a portion of his opinion not joined by Kennedy,
Roberts referred to the design and operation of the challenged plans
as “directed only to racial balance, pure and simple, an objective this
Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate.”168 Later, he said
“[r]acial balancing is not transformed from ‘patently unconstitutional’
to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it ‘racial
diversity.’”169 Justice Kennedy joined the plurality in concluding that
the school districts failed to show that their plans were narrowly
tailored, particularly because they did not establish necessity and
they did not show they considered methods other than explicit racial

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
Id. at 2746.
Id. at 2747.
Id. at 2749-50.
Id. at 2749.
Justice Roberts was joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2754.
Id. at 2755.
Id. at 2758.
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classifications to achieve their stated goals.170 Finally, in a portion of
his opinion not joined by Kennedy, Justice Roberts gave a narrow
version of what Brown stands for, stating:
Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could go and
could not go to school based on the color of their skin. The school
districts in these cases have not carried the heavy burden of
demonstrating that we should allow this once again—even for very
different reasons. For schools that never segregated on the basis of
race, such as Seattle, or that have removed the vestiges of past
segregation, such as Jefferson County, the way “to achieve a
system of determining admission to the public schools on a
nonracial basis,” is to stop assigning students on a racial basis. The
way to stop discriminating on the basis of race is to stop
discrimination on the basis of race.171

Responding to this language, Justice Stevens, in his dissent,
states:
There is a cruel irony in the Chief Justice’s reliance on our decision
in [Brown]. The first sentence in the concluding paragraph of his
opinion states: “Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they
could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin.”
This sentence reminds me of Anatole France’s observation: “[T]he
majestic equality of the la[w], forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep
under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.” The
Chief Justice fails to note that it was only black schoolchildren who
were so ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of
white children struggling to attend black schools. In this and other
ways, the Chief Justice rewrites the history of one of this Court’s
most important decisions.172

Justice Stevens goes on to attack what he calls the Court’s “rigid
adherence to tiers of scrutiny” because it “obscures Brown’s clear
message.”173
When it comes to affirmative steps voluntarily taken by school
districts to avoid resegregation, it appears apparent that the
plurality wants strict scrutiny to be fatal in practice. Justice Thomas,
in his concurring opinion, refuses to recognize even the starkest
racial imbalance as resegregation because the term segregation is
reserved for de jure segregation.174 Justice Kennedy, while agreeing

170. Id. at 2759-60.
171. Id. at 2768 (second, third, and fourth alteration in original) (citation omitted).
The simplistic final sentence sounds good in the abstract, but it ignores the reality of
our real world, in which much discrimination is unconscious, in the sense that it is
based on stereotypes. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
172. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes
omitted).
173. Id. at 2799.
174. Id. at 2768-70 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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that the plans were not narrowly tailored, sees it differently.175 He
states that parts of the plurality opinion “imply an all-too-unyielding
insistence that race cannot be a factor in instances when, in my view,
it may be taken into account,” and that “[t]he plurality opinion is at
least open to the interpretation that the Constitution requires school
districts to ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in
schooling.”176 Further, “[t]o the extent the plurality opinion suggests
the Constitution mandates that state and local school authorities
must accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my
view, profoundly mistaken.”177 He goes on to say school districts may
“seek to reach Brown’s objective of equal educational opportunity,”
and that “it is permissible to consider the racial makeup of schools
and to adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body,
one aspect of which is its racial composition.”178 Most importantly,
Justice Kennedy said “[a] compelling interest exists in avoiding racial
isolation, an interest that a school district, in its discretion and
expertise, may choose to pursue. Likewise, a district may consider it
a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student population.”179 He
concludes by encouraging school districts to continue “the important
work of bringing together students of different racial, ethnic, and
economic backgrounds.”180
So, what does the decision in Parents Involved mean for the
future? If the plurality view prevails, strict scrutiny will, in fact, be
fatal, and states and school districts will simply have to accept
resegregation that is not the direct result of government action. In
contrast, if the four dissenting Justices prevail, affirmative steps to
address the inequality inherent in segregation will be allowed. The
key, of course, is Justice Kennedy and whether a school district can
convince him that its plan is narrowly tailored.181
The irony of the Court’s rigid adherence to strict scrutiny in all
cases alleging race discrimination, both invidious and benign, is that
such scrutiny is not necessary to strike down invidious

175. See id. at 2788-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 2791.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2791-92.
179. Id. at 2797.
180. Id.
181. While Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Parents Involved is encouraging to school
districts interested in taking benign race-conscious actions, Justice Kennedy has
consistently voted in favor of striking down such actions. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 387 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 204 (1995); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 631 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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discrimination.182 As a result heightened scrutiny serves no purpose
other than to strike down benign race-conscious actions designed to
achieve racial equality. A racial classification, the purpose of which is
to disadvantage a racial minority, violates equal protection even if a
court applies a heightened version of rational basis. For example, in
Romer v. Evans,183 the Court recognized “that if a law neither
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will
uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational
relation to some legitimate end,”184 but went on to strike down a
Colorado constitutional amendment that prohibited the passage of
any law banning discrimination based on sexual orientation because
there was no legitimate governmental purpose, that is “the
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of
persons affected.”185 The Court relied, in part, on its earlier decision
in U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,186 where it stated that if
“‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very
least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest.”187 Based on the rationale of Romer and Moreno, invidious
race discrimination would be struck down utilizing rational basis
because such action is “born of animosity.”188
In contrast, affirmative government actions designed to promote
racial equality have a legitimate governmental purpose—racial
equality and equal opportunity—and the means utilized are
rationally related to that purpose. In short, strict scrutiny is not
needed to strike down invidious discrimination based on the Equal
Protection Clause, but strict scrutiny serves to prohibit nearly all
voluntary race-conscious steps taken by government in an effort to
achieve racial equality. It is difficult to believe that this was the
intent or goal of those who fought for the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

182. In McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964), the Court said racial
classifications, in most circumstances, are “irrelevant to any constitutionally
acceptable legislative purpose.”
183. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
184. Id. at 631.
185. Id. at 634.
186. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
187. Id. at 534 (emphasis omitted).
188. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634. Justice Ginsburg, in her concurring opinion in
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 951-52 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., concurring), and her
dissenting opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 169-91 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting), the so-called “partial birth abortion” cases, states that a statutorily
imposed burden on the constitutional right to choose to have an abortion constitutes
an “undue burden” if its only justification is that the legislature chose it as a means of
expressing its hostility to the constitutional right.
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT AS THE PROBLEM
The net effect of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence is
that the Equal Protection Clause has become a huge barrier to
achieving racial equality. It appears that the Court’s message to
government is that it is free to engage in invidious race
discrimination so long as it is able to mask the discrimination. In
other words, do not make the racial classification explicit and find
proxies for your discriminatory purposes. Racial discrimination may
flourish so long as it is disguised in a manner that makes it difficult
for any challenger to establish the real purpose of facially neutral
policies and practices. Similarly, benign efforts to promote equality
that take race into account are more likely to survive if government
is not transparent, that is, government attempts to mask its raceconscious decisions. Can this result possibly be consistent with the
Equal Protection Clause? Is it possible that the clause has nothing to
do with actual equality? Why did the Court choose this path?
To address the last question posed above, it is necessary to
examine the “top three” decisions that have led to the current status
of the law.189 Starting with Milliken, the decision that severely
limited the power of the courts to address segregation in elementary
and secondary education by restricting the use of an interdistrict
remedy,190 we should examine what was at stake in the case, that is,
the ability of whites to flee from integrated schools. It was easy for
parents to flee from Detroit and move a few miles to a nearby,
mostly-white, school district.191 This was a less costly alternative to
sending their children to a private, mostly-white, school.192 The Court
was unwilling to take this “right to flee” from parents, so it ignored
the fact that Michigan, like most states, had made a conscious
decision to vest control over its public schools in local school
districts.193 Even if fleeing is private action, not subject to the
restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment, certainly the organization
and governance of the public schools is state action. In Norwood, the
Court recognized what Mississippi was doing—assisting white
parents who wanted to flee from public schools that were ordered to
desegregate by subsidizing the mostly-white private schools—and
189. I am referring to Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989). A fourth decision, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995),
made the evil of Croson, the use of strict scrutiny when a benign racial classification is
challenged, more comprehensive in that it applied strict scrutiny to benign
classifications made by Congress.
190. See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745.
191. See id. at 804-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
192. See id. at 801-02.
193. See id. at 763 (White, J., dissenting).
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found a violation of the Equal Protection Clause because of the
impermissible effect of the state’s action.194
Why was Mississippi’s action struck down while Michigan’s was
upheld? Of course there are factual differences, for example,
Mississippi’s goal was more obvious and Michigan’s explanation
(local control of public schools) was more legitimate, but are there
real differences? In both states, the effect was impermissible in that
it facilitated the private action of white parents who wanted to
interfere with Brown’s mandate to desegregate public schools. In
short, Milliken allowed states to facilitate the efforts of white parents
who were intent upon avoiding the Court’s mandate to integrate
public schools. This looks a bit like what the Court would not allow in
Shelley v. Kramer,195 when the Court reversed the decision of a state
court in Missouri that was very willing to assist white parents who
sought the assistance of government in carrying out a racially
restrictive covenant.196 While Michigan could not have prevented its
residents from leaving the state to avoid integration, it certainly did
not have to facilitate their efforts by ceding control of its schools to
local districts and boards.197
Following closely on the heels of Milliken, the Court in Davis
made explicit what was implicit in Milliken, that is, discriminatory
effects alone, without a discriminatory purpose, do not violate the
Equal Protection Clause.198 This decision was instrumental in
gutting the Equal Protection Clause because the Court made it clear
that the clause did not assure actual equality.199 Davis paved the way
for the Court’s retreat from Brown in public education by making it
clear that neither segregation nor resegregation violates the Equal
Protection Clause so long as the challengers cannot prove it is the
result of government action.200 As made clear in a subsequent
decision, government is now free to ignore the obvious discriminatory
effects of its action so long as it masks any discriminatory purpose.201
What was really at stake in Davis, beyond the employment test
utilized by the District of Columbia? This decision goes to the guts of
the Equal Protection Clause in that it relieved government of any
constitutional obligation to promote equality by monitoring the
effects of its actions. As stated earlier, in a more sinister way, Davis
194. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 466-67 (1973).
195. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
196. See id. at 20-21.
197. See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741-43.
198. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
199. See id. at 240-41 (noting the existence of predominantly black or white schools
is not alone violative of equal protection).
200. See id.
201. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-79 (1979).
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legalized government activity designed to maintain inequality so long
as its purpose could not be unmasked. In other words, the Equal
Protection Clause does not guarantee actual equality, only formal (de
jure) equality. There is nothing in the language of the Equal
Protection Clause that mandates the result in Davis, nor is Justice
White’s opinion for the Court compelling. Justice White refers to a
number of prior decisions to support his conclusion that “our cases
have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act,
without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory
purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially
disproportionate impact.”202 He concedes “[t]here are some
indications to the contrary in our cases.”203 My point is simply that
there is nothing in either the language of the Equal Protection
Clause or the Court’s prior decisions that dictated the result in
Davis.
Even if one is convinced that the purpose of the clause was to
reach only intentional discrimination, the Court could have reached a
different result by simply applying the well-established
understanding of intent in tort law—“intent as volition or intent as
awareness of consequences.”204 Alternatively, the Court could have
utilized the approach developed in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,205 for
cases alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII.206
Very briefly, under Griggs, the plaintiff can establish a prima facie
case by showing that a facially neutral practice has a significant
disproportionate impact, thus shifting the burden of persuasion to
the employer to show that the practice has a manifest relationship to
the job at issue.207 This is similar to the scheme employed in an equal
protection case, Castaneda v. Partida,208 where the Court held that a
stark statistical disparity showing a substantial underrepresentation
of Mexican-Americans selected for grand jury duty establishes a
prima facie case209 and shifts “the burden of proof to the State to
dispel the inference of intentional discrimination.”210 So, in light of
the credible alternatives to its holding in Davis, how can we explain
the decision in Davis? Maybe the Court was simply unwilling to
202. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239 (emphasis omitted).
203. Id. at 242.
204. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
205. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
206. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a) (2000).
207. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32. Subsequently, the Court modified Griggs in Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657-58 (1989), making the proof scheme less
plaintiff friendly, and a few years later, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-(2)(m), (k) (2000), Congress restored most of the Griggs holding.
208. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
209. Id. at 495.
210. Id. at 497-98.
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promote true equality by forcing government to prepare a
“discriminatory effects impact statement” before it takes action. As
suggested by Justice Stevens in his concurring opinions in Davis and
Feeney,211 the Court could have ruled in favor of the government in
these two cases without gutting the Equal Protection Clause.
One more step and the Court’s mission was complete—to avoid
racial equality, it needed to subject affirmative government steps
designed to promote equality to strict scrutiny. After several years of
litigation, the Court accomplished this in Croson and Adarand. In an
effort to disguise what it is really doing in these cases, several
Justices insist that race-conscious actions will only perpetuate race
discrimination. For example, in his plurality opinion in Parents
Involved, Chief Justice Roberts states, without any supporting
empirical data, that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”212 In the same
case, Justice Thomas refuses to view racial imbalance as
segregation213 and argues that there is really no difference between
invidious and benign discrimination.214 Is there really no difference
between an action taken for the purpose of promoting equality and
an action taken for the purpose of hurting a particular race? Isn’t the
latter action “born of animosity,” while the former action is wellintentioned? Even if it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between
the two,215 in most circumstances, it will not be difficult and the trier
of fact should be up to the task.216
Assuming that all three of these “top three” decisions raise
difficult issues, that reasonable people could differ, and that there is
some support for the Court’s decisions, these assumptions do not
provide an explanation for why the Court selected the path it did
rather than the path that would have promoted racial equality.
Given the nature of constitutional interpretation, which leaves some
slack in joints of the various provisions, it is quite apparent that the

211. See supra note 77.
212. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2768 (2007). In fact, the empirical data may suggest that benign race-conscious
decisionmaking may promote equality by reducing unconscious or implicit bias. See
supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
213. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2769 (Thomas, J., concurring).
214. Id. at 2782 (criticizing the dissent’s “rejection of the colorblind Constitution”).
215. Id. at 2786 n.27 (“How does one tell when a racial classification is invidious?”).
216. In considering a facial challenge to the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, the
Court, including Justice Thomas, indicated it “has given state and federal legislatures
wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific
uncertainty.” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007). Should the same
deference be given to legislatures when making judgments about the need for
affirmative steps to achieve racial equality when there is uncertainty about whether
specific steps will actually promote equality?
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Court, beginning in the mid-1970s, deliberately selected the path
that perpetuates and even promotes racial inequality. When a
perfectly legitimate, reasonable, and justifiable alternative existed,
the Court’s choice is unjustified.
V.

CONCLUSION

Contrary to Alexander Bickel’s description of the Court,217 in the
area of racial equality, it is indeed the “most dangerous branch”
because, with the exception of a short period between 1954 and 1973,
it has consistently interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment in a
manner that prevents it, and the other branches of the federal
government as well as state and local government, from promoting
racial equality. While the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished
slavery as a matter of law, the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which serves to strike down most de jure
discrimination, and several federal statutes that address
discrimination by both government and private parties in certain
activities have resulted in substantial progress in our society, they
have not resulted in any semblance of racial equality. A major
promoter of this sad state of affairs, I believe, has been the U.S.
Supreme Court.

217.

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
(1976).

AT THE BAR OF POLITICS

